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ABSTRACT 
The Unconscious Thought Theory argues that making complex decisions after a 
period of distraction can lead to better decision quality than deciding either 
immediately or after conscious deliberation. Two studies have tested this 
Unconscious Thought Effect (UTE) in clinical diagnosis with conflicting results. The 
studies used different methodologies and had methodological weaknesses. We 
attempted to replicate the UTE in medical diagnosis by providing favorable conditions 
for the effect, while maintaining ecological validity.  
 
Family physicians (N=116) diagnosed three complex cases in one of three thinking 
modes: immediate, unconscious (UT) and conscious (CT). Cases were divided into 
short sentences, which were presented briefly and sequentially on computer. After 
each case presentation, the immediate response group gave a diagnosis; the UT 
group performed a 2-back distraction task for 3 minutes before giving a diagnosis; 
and the CT group could take as long as necessary before giving a diagnosis.  
 
We found no differences in diagnostic accuracy between groups (P=0.95). The CT 
group took a median of 7 seconds to diagnose, which suggests that physicians were 
able to diagnose “online”, as information was being presented. The lack of a 
difference between the immediate and UT groups suggests that the distraction had 
no additional effect on performance.  
 
To assess the decisiveness of the evidence of this null result, we computed a Bayes 
Factor (BF01) for the two comparisons of interest. We found a BF01 of 5.76 for the UT 
vs. immediate comparison, and of 3.61 for the UT vs. CT comparison. Both BFs 
provide substantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis: physicians’ diagnoses 
made after distraction are no better than diagnoses made either immediately or after 
self-paced deliberation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT), there are two modes of 
thought: a conscious mode, where thinking about a task happens while the task is in 
the focus of conscious attention; and an unconscious mode, where thinking occurs 
while conscious attention is directed elsewhere.1 The unconscious mode of thought 
has a much greater capacity for holding, weighting and integrating information than 
the conscious mode. Therefore, decisions made after a period of distraction with an 
unrelated task can be better than those made after conscious deliberation. This 
phenomenon is termed the “Unconscious Thought Effect” (UTE), previously known 
as the “Deliberation Without Attention Effect”.2 
In typical demonstrations of the UTE, participants are presented with several options, 
e.g., apartments, which vary on a number of attributes, e.g., size, location, 
cleanliness, and price amongst others. Each attribute is presented sequentially on a 
computer screen in either a random or a fixed order and for a few seconds only. 
Following this, and depending on the experimental condition, participants are either 
instructed to think consciously for several minutes (usually 4 minutes) or are 
distracted to prevent any conscious thought for the same length of time or, in some 
studies, are asked to respond immediately. Those who are distracted are found to 
choose the best option (defined either objectively or subjectively) more frequently 
than in the other conditions and to form more favorable impressions of that option.  
The Unconscious Thought Theory has been strongly criticized3 4 and has been the 
topic of numerous replication attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, with 
conflicting findings even at the level of meta-analysis. 5 6 7 Although choice has been 
the domain par excellence for demonstrations of the UTE, there is some evidence 
that it may not be the only one. The effect has also been investigated in sports 
predictions,8 moral dilemmas,9 evaluating the persuasiveness of messages,10 and 
clinical diagnosis.11 12 
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Two studies have investigated the UTE in clinical diagnosis, with conflicting results. 
Mamede and colleagues compared diagnoses of written cases by internal medicine 
residents and 4th-year medical students under conscious, unconscious and 
immediate thought modes, in a within-subjects design.12 The UTE was found with 
medical students but not with doctors and only in simple rather than in complex 
cases. This is in contrast to the Unconscious Thought Theory, which would predict 
the effect for complex cases and experienced participants. There are two 
methodological concerns with this study. First, the conscious thought condition 
consisted of an unusual procedure that required participants to list on paper all 
relevant diagnostic hypotheses, and for each hypothesis to list the expected cues 
that were present in and those that were absent from the case. This is clearly more 
systematic than what clinicians would naturally do if they were asked to think about a 
case before making a diagnosis. Furthermore, it is likely that this procedure would 
alleviate the working memory load of the conscious thinkers, which is proposed to 
limit the success of the conscious thought mode. Second, the complex cases 
consisted of uncommon diseases or atypical presentations. It is not clear whether 4th-
year students had the necessary knowledge to diagnose such cases, which would 
undermine their ability to encode properly all the information necessary to diagnose, 
as required for the UTE to occur.  
 
Another attempted replication of the UTE in clinical diagnosis was in the domain of 
mental health, where participants (clinical psychology students) diagnosed two cases 
in either an unconscious or a conscious thought mode.11 The cases were described 
as “complex” because each included two diagnoses (DSM classifications). 
Participants were asked to give two diagnoses per case. The study found a sizeable 
UTE (η2=0.15) in a one-way ANOVA, where accuracy (range 0-4) was treated as a 
continuous variable. Inspection of Table 1 in the publication (p. 580) shows more 
instances of 2 correct diagnoses in the unconscious than the conscious thought 
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mode. There are however methodological concerns here too. First, there was no 
immediate response condition. This means that we cannot know whether the effect 
was due to unconscious thought improving performance or conscious thought 
impairing it. Neither can we know to what extent participants’ responses reflected a 
diagnosis made before rather than during the period of distraction or deliberation. 
Second, diagnoses for the two cases were collected after participants had read both 
cases. This possibly confounded the distraction manipulation, as even those in the 
conscious thought mode would have had their attention taken away from the first 
case (distraction) while reading the second case. Finally, neither of the two studies 
had an ecologically valid deliberation condition, thereby comparing UT with a more 
natural thinking mode. 
 
We sought to conduct an improved replication of the UTE in medical diagnosis with 
family physicians as participants and an ecologically valid deliberation condition. The 
study aimed to investigate differences in the diagnostic accuracy of physicians 




We constructed three clinical vignettes based on real patient cases. In an earlier 
study, we asked family physicians to describe cases where they felt that they knew 
the diagnosis but did not know how they knew.13 We selected three of these cases 
for use in the current study. Case selection was based on the following criteria:  
 
1) Case descriptions contained sufficient information in order for the final diagnosis 
(i.e., the diagnosis of the original physician, which was also the patient’s actual 
diagnosis) to be objectively the “best answer”.  
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2) Cases represented different conditions/disease areas. Limiting materials to a 
single case or to cases from a single disease area might advantage participants with 
specialist knowledge in that area.* 
 
3) Cases represented different types of diagnostic difficulty. Case 1 involved a final 
diagnosis that was unlikely for the patient and a more common, competing diagnosis 
that partially explained the symptoms. Case 2 had multiple, competing, potential 
causes. Case 3 could easily elicit an unlikely but life-threatening diagnosis that 
needed urgent treatment, and a more likely, competing diagnosis that explained the 
symptoms (the final diagnosis).  
 
An experienced family physician (BCD) helped to analyze the cases and write them 
in the form of vignettes for use in the study (see Appendix). He also confirmed that 
the final diagnosis was the best answer in each case.  
 
Sample size and recruitment 
To calculate the required sample size, we used the data in Table 1 of the article by 
De Vries and colleagues (p. 580).11 The table presents the number of correct DSM 
classifications (diagnoses), by case and thinking mode (UT and CT). Our vignettes 
had only one diagnosis each; therefore our accuracy variable was binary 
(correct/incorrect). On the other hand, each case in the De Vries et al. study had 2 
diagnoses (co-morbidities); therefore, the researchers scored the responses per 
case as 0 (no correct diagnosis), 1 (1 correct diagnosis) or 2 (both diagnoses correct). 
To calculate sample size for a dichotomous outcome variable, we converted the 0-2 
scores in the article’s Table 1 into ether 1 or 0, where 1 meant that both diagnoses 
                                                
* Although family physicians are “generalists”, they often develop specialist interests and expertise in 
specific medical conditions or areas of medicine. 
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were correct. We also added up the responses from the two cases, which resulted in 
proportional diagnostic accuracy of 0.56 (45/80) for the UT group and 0.34 (27/80) 
for the CT group. To capture this difference in proportions between two groups with a 
power of 80% and alpha of 0.05, we would need 88 responses per group, i.e. a total 
of 264 responses (115 responses per group for 90% power). As the three cases 
varied widely in their content and type of difficulty, we expected independence of 
responses within participants. This is a common finding in studies of the diagnostic 
accuracy of general physicians, where responses to one case do not predict 
responses to other cases (“case specificity”).14-16 Therefore, we estimated that we 
would need 29 participants per group, providing 3 responses each, i.e., a total of 87 
participants providing 261 responses. Nevertheless, we sought to recruit as many 
participants as possible within the time and resources available, in the event that the 
independence assumption was not met. 
 
Participants were practicing family physicians and residents in family medicine in the 
UK. They were recruited through professional networks and at conferences. 
Participants were offered a £10 gift voucher in return for their time. 
 
Procedure 
Study materials were presented and responses were collected using a macro-
enabled Microsoft PowerPoint presentation. Data collection took place over the 
Internet, in a single session, while participants were in concurrent phone 
communication with a researcher (AW), who facilitated the session. 
 
The study followed a mixed factorial design, where each participant diagnosed all the 
vignettes in one of three thinking modes: immediate, conscious thought (CT) or 
unconscious thought (UT). Participants in the immediate response group gave their 
diagnosis immediately after each vignette presentation. In the CT group, participants 
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were instructed to think carefully about their diagnosis after each vignette and 
respond when they were ready. We chose a self-paced rather than a fixed-time 
conscious thought condition, as more representative of the medical diagnostic 
process. In the UT group, participants completed a 2-back task for 3 minutes after 
each vignette, and then diagnosed. In the 2-back task, participants see a single digit 
presented in the middle of the screen. They first press “next” for a new digit to be 
presented, then “next” again for a third digit. At this point, “yes” and “no” buttons are 
provided and the participant needs to decide for each new digit whether it is the 
same as the digit shown 2 places previously (2 back). N-back tasks (recalling digits 
seen “n” places previously), although simple to perform, require continuous 
conscious attention, and thus use all available working memory preventing 
deliberation of the diagnosis task.17 
 
All participants completed a short practice case, including the 2-back task for those in 
the UT group. Subsequently, they saw the three vignettes in a random order. Each 
vignette was broken down into individual cues, which were presented in the middle of 
the screen, one at a time, for 4 seconds each. The sequence of cue presentation 
was the same for all participants, as shown in the Appendix. Participants were 
instructed to assume that any symptom, sign or test result not included in the 
vignettes was absent/normal. 
 
At the end of each vignette presentation and when appropriate for each condition 
(i.e., after physicians in the UT condition had completed the n-back task and 
physicians in the CT condition had indicated that they were ready to diagnose), a 
new screen appeared that instructed participants to “Please enter your diagnosis 
NOW”. In all conditions, responses on this screen were time-restricted to 20 seconds 
to prevent extensive thinking. A countdown clock was displayed on the screen.  
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As a manipulation check, we recorded the 2-back scores of the UT group. We also 
recorded time spent thinking before a diagnosis was given in the CT group.  
 
Analyses 
Diagnoses were scored as either correct or incorrect, depending on whether they 
matched the final diagnosis of each case. When participants gave more than one 
diagnosis, their response was scored as correct if it included the final diagnosis. We 
also employed a more detailed accuracy measure by scoring responses as correct, 
partially correct, or incorrect. We then collapsed correct with partially correct 
responses for a more generous measure of accuracy.  
 
In case 1 (rectal cancer), partially correct diagnoses included inflammatory bowel 
conditions, such as Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis, which could explain some 
of the symptoms but not the spontaneous rectal bleeding and visible rectal mass. 
Diagnoses such as hemorrhoids and anxiety were scored as incorrect, as they did 
not acknowledge the possibility of serious disease. 
 
In case 2 (heart failure), partially correct responses included angina, ischemic heart 
disease, or simply “heart problem” or “cardiac problem”, as well as any mention of 
cancer. Ischemic heart disease is a pre-existing condition in this patient but could not 
cause fatigue without heart failure. Cancer, specifically lung cancer, is a possible 
diagnosis in this case but much less likely than heart failure. Diagnoses such as 
depression/low mood/psychological issues, obese/unfit patient, and viral illness were 
considered incorrect, as they ignored signs of serious disease. 
 
In case 3 (migraine), subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH) and meningitis could be 
considered partially correct, although the lack of any neurological signs to indicate 
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raised intracranial pressure make SAH unlikely, and the lack of any neck stiffness or 
rash make meningitis unlikely.  
 
We tested the assumption of independence of responses (diagnostic accuracy) per 
physician by calculating the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). We tested the 
effect of thinking mode on diagnostic accuracy using logistic regression and the 
association between thinking mode and the 3-level measure of diagnostic accuracy 
using a chi square test. Given that the theory predicts stronger UTE for more 
experienced participants and more difficult problems, we also tested for differences 
in diagnostic accuracy between the three cases and for associations between 
diagnostic accuracy and physician experience using logistic regressions. We report 
results from univariate regression models. Thinking times in the CT group were log 
transformed to correct for skewness and compared between correct and incorrect 
responses using a two-tailed t-test. We used STATA 13.1 to analyze the data. 
 
Finally, we calculated Bayes factors for the two comparisons of interest: UT vs. 
Immediate, and UT vs. CT. This allows us to draw conclusions on the basis of null 
results, which would be considered inconclusive in the classical inferential statistics 
tradition. Bayes Factor (BF01) is a likelihood ratio: it is the ratio of the probability of 
the data under H0 (no difference in accuracy) to the probability of the data under H1 
(UT is more accurate than Immediate/CT modes). Bayes factor values have been 
classified into grades of evidence ranging from “decisive” (BFs > 100) to “anecdotal” 
(BFs range from 3 to 1).18 To compute the Bayes factors, we used the web-based 
applet by Rouder and colleagues (http://pcl.missouri.edu/bf-two-sample) and kept the 
scale factor r on effect size to the default (1.0).19 For the BF calculations, we used the 
number of respondents per group and calculated t values based on the mean 




One hundred and sixteen family physicians participated, including 15 residents in 
family medicine. Half of the participants were female and the mean experience of the 
sample was 11 years in family medicine (SD 11, median 6, range 0-44 years). We 
obtained data on two rather than three cases from five respondents due to a 
computer failure, resulting in a total of 343 responses. There were 40 participants in 
the UT group providing a total of 118 responses, 38 participants in the immediate 
response group (112 responses) and 38 in the CT group (113 responses). The 
assumption of independence of responses was verified: the ICC for diagnostic 
accuracy approached 0 and was not significant (P=0.50).  
 
The mean accuracy on the 2-back task (correct responses over all responses) was 
0.88 (SD 0.09). No participant scored less than 0.50, suggesting that they were 
paying attention to the task, which fulfilled its role as a distractor. 
 
Table 1 presents mean diagnostic accuracy (proportion of correct diagnoses over all 
diagnoses) per thinking mode and case. We found no effect of thinking mode on 
diagnostic accuracy: odds ratio (OR) 0.99 [95% CI 0.56 to 1.75] for immediate and 
OR 0.70 [0.39 to 1.28] for CT compared to UT. Case 3 (migraine) was diagnosed 
correctly more often than both case 1 (rectal cancer) (OR 3.26 [95% CI 1.77 to 6.01], 
P<0.001) and case 2 (heart failure) (OR 2.47 [1.38 to 4.42], P=0.002), and this was 
observed across all thinking modes (Table 1). We detected no relationship between 
physician experience and accuracy (OR 1.00 [0.98 to 1.03]).  
 
Table 2 presents frequencies and percentages of correct, partially correct and 
incorrect responses per thinking mode and case. We found no relationship between 
thinking mode and this 3-level measure of diagnostic accuracy (P=0.40). When we 
collapsed partially correct and correct diagnoses for a more generous measure of 
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accuracy, we found no effect of thinking mode: OR 1.00 [95% CI 0.58 to 1.72] for 
immediate and OR 0.78 [0.45 to 1.32] for CT compared to UT. 
 
Thinking times in the CT group ranged from 2 seconds to 2:87 minutes (median 7 
seconds), with only four instances where respondents took longer than a minute. No 
differences in thinking times were detected between correct and incorrect diagnoses 
(P=0.24). 
 
The Bayes Factor (BF01) for the UT vs. immediate comparison was 5.76; the data are 
almost 6 times more likely to occur if there is no difference between UT and 
immediate thinking modes than if there is a difference. This provides “substantial” 
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, according to the proposed grades of 
evidence (BFs range from 10 to 3 in the “substantial” category).18 The BF01 for the UT 
vs. CT comparison was 3.61, also providing substantial evidence in favor of the null 
hypothesis. Given the independence of responses within physicians, as verified by 
the low ICC, we repeated the BF01 calculations, this time basing the t values on the 
raw accuracy data, rather than the physician means, and using the number of 
responses as each group’s sample size. This resulted in higher BFs for both 
comparisons: 9.65† for UT vs. immediate and 5.02 for UT vs. CT. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We aimed to replicate the Unconscious Thought Effect (UTE) in medical diagnosis. 
We used cases based on real patients that reflected different types of diagnostic 
difficulty and family physicians as study participants. We used a between-participants 
design, which ensures that there are no carry-over effects from one thinking mode to 
another, as a participant diagnoses cases in alternate modes. Our distraction 
manipulation was successful and we can thus be confident that UT participants’ 
                                                
† Bayes factors between 30 and 10 provide “strong” evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.18 
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attention remained away from the diagnostic task during distraction. We included an 
immediate response condition, so that any extra benefits of UT could be properly 
assessed. Finally, we made the deliberation mode self-paced and thus, more 
ecologically valid.  
 
We did not find any differences in accuracy between thinking modes, hence no 
evidence that one mode is more beneficial than another. In fact, the Bayes factors 
indicated that we found substantial evidence for the null hypothesis: physicians’ 
diagnoses made after a period of distraction with an unrelated task are no better than 
diagnoses made either immediately or after self-paced deliberation. Accuracy 
depended on the case rather than on thinking mode.  
 
We provided auspicious conditions to allow the UTE to manifest:  
1. We gave participants a general goal, central to their decision making, i.e., the goal 
to diagnose, rather than a more specific and peripheral goal, e.g., to identify patient 
risk factors. We gave them this goal before rather than after the distraction, as 
required for the effect to occur. The meta-analysis by Strick and colleagues found 
larger UTEs when central-general goals were induced.6  
 
2. Diagnostic accuracy for all our cases was low, suggesting that they were indeed 
difficult. The meta-analysis found that complex decision problems led to larger effect 
sizes than simple decision problems.  
 
3. We used experts rather than novices as study participants. There is evidence that 
experts benefit from unconscious thought more than non-experts.8 At the same time, 
the meta-analysis cautions that too much expertise could inhibit UTE by making the 
task too easy. This was not the case in our study (see point 2 above).  
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4. We kept the distraction time relatively short (3 minutes); the meta-analysis by 
Strick and colleagues found that longer intervals of 7 or 8 minutes hampered the 
UTE. 
 
5. Our materials were ecologically valid. Our cases were based on real patients, 
were complex, and contained the information that the family physicians, who had 
diagnosed the cases correctly, had elicited. They were therefore likely to have 
induced motivation and interest in our participants. The meta-analysis found that 
ecologically valid tasks tend to generate larger UTEs. 
 
Our study thus adds to the number of studies that have failed to find any evidence of 
the superiority of “unconscious thought”.5 7 20-26 Could we have provided even more 
auspicious conditions for the UTE to occur? 
 
1. The meta-analysis by Strick and colleagues found that word-search puzzles 
produced larger UTEs than more cognitively demanding distraction tasks but this 
made a difference only for the UT vs. CT comparison and not for the UT vs. 
immediate comparison. The authors suggested that such tasks potentially compete 
with UT for resources. We expected physicians to be motivated to provide accurate 
diagnoses and not stop thinking about the cases during relatively easy distraction 
tasks, therefore, we opted for a cognitively demanding distraction task. 
 
2. We allowed CT participants to give a diagnosis when they wished and did not 
impose on them a fixed time for thinking. Payne and colleagues did not find a UTE 
when using a self-paced CT condition vs. a UT condition and argued that the effect is 
due not to the superiority of UT but to overthinking and interference resulting from 
unnatural thinking times in the CT mode.22  
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3. Unconscious thought is purported to deal well with large amounts of information 
that exceed the processing capacity of conscious thought. We attempted to load 
participants’ working memory by presenting information quickly on screen. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that participants diagnosed “online”, despite the quick 
succession of time-limited information. The sequence of information had a narrative 
structure, which would have facilitated online processing and integration. Participants 
in the CT mode, who had the opportunity to think about their diagnosis, gave it within 
a few seconds, suggesting that online processing was possible. The lack of 
differences in accuracy between the immediate and UT modes suggests that 
diagnoses after distraction were simply the diagnoses that participants made during 
or at the end of each case’s presentation and that no further “unconscious” 
processing took place during distraction. The same argument was made recently by 
Nieuwenstein and colleagues, whose study participants (psychology 
undergraduates) took on average only 23 seconds in a multi-attribute choice task, 
even though they had the opportunity to deliberate for as long as they needed.27 
 
Using self-report type methods, Heneghan and colleagues attempted to chart family 
physicians’ diagnostic strategies.28 They found different variants of pattern-
recognition and rule-based strategies, and no analytical reasoning. Although self 
reporting may not provide reliable evidence about thinking processes, it shows that 
physicians consider themselves to rely on fast, automatic or semi-automatic 
processes almost exclusively. In a study by Flores and colleagues, clinical 
psychologists read clinical reports, consisting of a number of sentences sequentially 
presented on screen (the pace of presentation was determined by the clinician).29  
One sentence per report was inconsistent with the disorder named at the beginning 
of the report. Reading times for inconsistent sentences about highly relevant 
symptoms were longer than for inconsistent sentences about less relevant symptoms. 
The authors suggested that participants were able to detect inconsistencies by 
 17 
employing fast, online reasoning processes. The text comprehension literature 
assumes that readers make online inferences during reading, and that this enables 
readers to maintain text coherence.30 31 Similarly, theories of cognitive consistency32 
assume that people do not wait to receive all the information before making a 
judgment, but process information actively, as it arrives, sometimes distorting it to 
support their emerging judgments33 (this “predecisional information distortion” has 
also been established with family physicians34 35). Finally, there is evidence that it is 
the order in which information is received rather than the thinking mode that 
determines final judgments, with “unconscious thought” not adding anything to and 
not enhancing the final judgment in any way.36 These multiple sources of evidence 
converge to suggest that fast, online processing represents an important hurdle for 
the UTE. Strick and colleagues “suspect that unconscious thought thrives most when 
the presentation time is just long enough to encode the information, but also short 
enough to prevent further on-line processing” (p. 757).6 Thus, the UTE appears 
extremely sensitive to experimental manipulations, and the ideal conditions for it 
seem hard to achieve, and may not be achievable in real life decision making. We 
should also mention a very recent attempt to replicate the UTE in multi-attribute 
choice: the study by Nieuwenstein and colleagues was both adequately powered and 
maintained all the conditions found in Strick and colleagues’ meta-analysis to favor 
the UTE. Nevertheless, no differences were found between the UT and deliberation 
conditions (there was no immediate response condition), leading the authors to 
suggest that the UTE is found only in studies with small sample sizes, which produce 
unreliable results. This hypothesis was subsequently supported by their meta-
analysis of 69 studies of the UTE in multi-attribute choice, which found that the UTE 





Study weaknesses and future research 
Although we used cases based on real doctor-patient encounters, our materials 
could still be criticized as not sufficiently ecologically valid. Our case vignettes were 
provided entirely in verbal form. Some of the information would have been obtained 
visually by the physician; for example, the appearance of the hemorrhoids upon 
examination (case 1), and the general appearance of the obese patient complaining 
of exhaustion (case 2). This could explain the low diagnostic accuracy obtained in 
these two cases – the original physicians who had diagnosed them accurately and 
later recounted them to us had seen these patients, not their vignettes. It is also likely 
that different physicians would have requested different information from their 
patients. Therefore, despite the control afforded by presenting the same verbal 
descriptions to participants – which also enabled comparability with the two previous 
studies of UTE in medical diagnosis11 12 – we need to be cautious when applying our 
conclusions to real life clinical encounters. Future research could test the UTE 
paradigm with more realistic clinical materials, perhaps even with standardized 
patients (i.e. actors). Distraction in such realistic situations could be operationalized 
not with anagrams and n-back tasks but with more plausible interruptions, such as 
phone calls and requests for prescriptions or medical advice, unrelated to the 
diagnosis at hand. 
 
At the expense of ecological validity, future studies attempting to replicate the UTE in 
medical diagnosis could employ a “forced” CT condition, where participants are given 
a specific time to think about the problem, as in the original experimental paradigm.2 
However, we note that UK family physicians have 10-minute consultations; forcing 
them to think for 4 whole minutes about the diagnosis would be alien to their 
experience and entirely impractical for real life implementation. Future studies may 
also use simpler distraction tasks and develop manipulations that impede online 
processing of case information; for example, shorter presentation times, cues that 
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convey the necessary meaning using symbols and abbreviations rather than 
complete sentences, or non-narrative information structures. We should however 
note that even if the UTE were eventually achieved with such manipulations, its value 
for real life clinical practice would be minimal, unless it were shown to provide some 
advantage over the natural way that physicians diagnose. 
 
Finally, we should acknowledge an important difference between choice tasks, the 
domain par excellence of the UTE, and diagnostic tasks. In choice tasks, 
respondents are presented with explicit, alternative options and their attributes. In 
diagnosis, respondents must generate their own alternatives, while the cues 
presented are not pre-identified as supportive or not of the alternatives and must be 
interpreted by the participants. Previous research has suggested that diagnostic 
errors often occur because the physician has failed to even generate the correct 
hypothesis,14 37 38 whilst information search and interpretation depend on the 
hypothesis considered. 39 34 Therefore, in situations where the correct hypothesis has 
already been formulated, and diagnosis more closely resembles a choice between 
options, the UT effect may be more likely to occur. In other words, had we presented 
our participants with a list of diagnostic alternatives to consider, our results might 
have been different. This hypothesis could be tested in future studies. 
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Table 1: Mean diagnostic accuracy [95% CIs] per thinking mode and case. 
 
 Immediate UT CT Total 
Case 1 0.19 [0.08 – 0.35] 0.23 [0.12 – 0.38] 0.11 [0.03 – 0.25] 0.17 [0.11 – 0.26] 
Case 2 0.21 [0.10 – 0.37] 0.25 [0.13 – 0.41] 0.19 [0.08 – 0.35] 0.22 [0.15 – 0.30] 
Case 3 0.46 [0.30 – 0.63] 0.40 [0.24 – 0.57] 0.37 [0.22 – 0.54] 0.41 [0.32 – 0.50] 
Total 0.29 [0.20 - 0.38] 0.29 [0.21 – 0.38] 0.22 [0.15 – 0.31] 0.27 [0.22 – 0.32] 
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Table 2: Frequencies (%) of incorrect, partially correct and correct responses per 
case and thinking mode. 
 










































UT 0 23 (60.5%) 
15 
(39.5%) 38 








APPENDIX: The 3 vignettes broken down into individual cues. Each bulleted cue 
was presented sequentially on screen for 4 seconds. The potentially diagnostic cues 
are underlined and the differentiating cues are underlined and bolded. 
 
Vignette 1 Vignette 2 Vignette 3 
• 31-year old male. 
• Previous history of irritable 
bowel syndrome. 
• Investigated for IBS, including a 
colonoscopy. 
• “When I open my bowels there’s 
blood. There’s blood on the toilet 
paper, and in the toilet.” 
• “You know, quite a bit of blood. I 
mean, it’s pretty alarming!” 
• “It’s not really painful, but it’s 
uncomfortable.” 
• “I’ve been a little bit constipated 
over the past few weeks I 
suppose, but nothing too bad.” 
• “I’ve never had piles before.” 
• “My dad also gets these kinds of 
problems and it looks like it’s IBS 
too.” 
• “I’m really worried about this.” 
• “My wife’s due with our first baby 
in two weeks.” 
• “I’m worried it’s not going away 
before the baby comes.” 
• Around the edge of the anus 
there are several hemorrhoids 
and evidence of bleeding. 
• The patient is treated with an 
Anusol pessary and ointment. 
• Results from full blood count, 
ESR and ferritin are within 
normal ranges. 
• The results are given over the 
phone. 
• “The stuff you gave me seems to 
have worked, the bleeding’s 
stopped.” 
• One month later the patient 
requests a telephone 
consultation. 
• “I woke up this morning in a 
pool of blood.” 
• “I’m really worried about this.” 
• The patient attends the surgery 
the next day. 
• The patient looks tired. 
• “I’ve not slept properly for over a 
month. The baby’s up every few 
hours.” 
• “I’m not that constipated.” 
• “I didn’t notice I was bleeding 
• 52-year old male. 
• He had a coronary artery 
graft 7 years ago. 
• He appears obese. 
• The skin on his face is like that 
of a smoker. 
• His fingers are stained yellow 
from tar. 
• His voice is very deep. 
• “I just don’t have any energy.” 
• “Even after a short walk I need 
to sit down.” 
• “I don’t feel breathless, just 
exhausted.” 
• “A month ago I felt fine.” 
• “Then suddenly I feel like this.” 
• “It came on over a few days.” 
• “I’m finding it hard to do my 
job.” 
• “Usually I'm working really hard 
all day, but I can't do that, 
feeling like this.” 
• “I’m a chef.” 
• “It’s really busy and quite 
strenuous.” 
• “I’ve had angina for years 
• but it hasn’t got any worse.” 
• “I’ve had no other pains in my 
chest.” 
• “I used to smoke a packet a 
day.” 
• “I stopped smoking after my 
bypass.” 
• Pulse is regular. 
• Heart sounds are normal. 
• Chest sounds are normal. 
• Results from a full blood count 
are within normal range. 
• Glucose is normal. 
• Thyroid function is normal. 
• Liver function is normal. 
• Kidney function is normal. 
• 42-year old female. 
• She is a GP colleague at 
your practice. 
• She is very fit and in good 
health. 
• She complains of a severe 
headache. 
• “Can you cover my 
patients?” 
• “It's just come on pretty 
quickly.” 
• “I've taken some 
paracetamol.” 
• “I don't think I can drive 
home like this.” 
• “I'm just going to rest in my 
office for now.” 
• “I'm sure I'll feel better 
soon.” 
• “I'll get my husband to pick 
me up later if I still feel ill.” 
• You check on your 
colleague two hours later. 
• “I feel terrible.” 
• “It's got much worse.” 
• “The headache is awful.” 
• “I feel quite nauseous.” 
• “I don't know what's 
wrong.” 
• “I've never had a 
headache like this before.” 
• “I never really get 
headaches.” 
• “The light is really 
bothering me.” 
• “The noise is bothering me 
too.” 
• “It's just getting worse.” 
• She is alert. 
• She is able to walk. 
• She has normal sensation 
in her extremities. 
• Reflexes are normal. 
• Examination of the eyes 
is unremarkable. 
• Her temperature is 
36.7 °C. 
• Her pulse is regular and 
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until I woke up.” 
• “There was a lot of blood.” 
• The hemorrhoids previously 
examined appear to have 
amalgamated. 




IBS: Irritable Bowel Syndrome 
ESR: Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate, an inflammatory marker 
COPD: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
GP: General Practitioner (UK family physician) 
Paracetamol: Pain relief medication 
A temperature of 36.7 °C is normal 
 
 
 
 
